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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETER DOENGES, MILES CROCKARD, 
WILLIAM BOWEN, RICHARD H. WATSON 




CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation: EMIGRATION PROPERTIES 
PARTNERSHIP, a Utah limited partner-
ship, BOWERS-SORENSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and 
FRED A. SMOLKA, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16649 
Plaintiff-Respondents brought suit in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder, 
seeking to have Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401 (1953, as amended, 
1977) declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal 
Protection clause of both the United States and Utah Constitu-
tions. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Lower court granted Plaintiff-Respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and found Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401 (1953, 
as amended in 1977) unconstitutional. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
POSITION AS AMICUS CURIAE 
Amicus neither supports nor opposes this particular 
annexation, but contends that the Utah municipal annexation 
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law cited above, granting a petition right to real property 
owners but denying it to interested and affected non-property 
owners, is an unconstitutional denial of Equal ProL_ction. 
Amicus prays the Supreme Court affirm the lower court's 
holding that the municipal annexation statute, 10-2-401 (as 
amended, 1977), is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus concurs in Plaintiff-Respondents' statement 
of facts and hereby expressly incorporates it by reference. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SECTION 10-2-401 (AS AMENDED, 1977), BY 
GRANTING A RIGHT OF FRANCHISE BY PETITION 
TO OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY IN THE ANNEXA-
TION AREA, BUT DENYING THAT RIGHT TO 
INTERESTED AND AFFECTED NON-PROPERTY 
OWNERS IN THE SAME AREA, DENIES A FUNDAMEN-
TAL RIGHT OF EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND, BY SO DOING, 
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. THE QUESTION AT ISSUE DOES NOT CONCERN THE LEGISLATIVE 
GRANT OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITIES, OR THE MUNICIPALITIES' 
EXERCISE THEREOF; IT CONCERNS AN IMPROPER DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN PROPERTY OWNERS AND NON-PROPERTY OWNERS WHICH 
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION. 
It is essential, at the outset, to establish what 
exactly is at issue in this case. The issue does not revolve 
around the legislature's power to establish reasonable means 
whereby cities may annex unincorporated areas; rather, the 
issue is whether the legislature, after establishing an 
annexation procedure which grants a statutory franchise by 
petition to one set of interested annexees, may deny the sa~ 
right of petition to another set of equally interested and 
-2-
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affected annexees. It cannot be denied that this second set 
of annexees--residents whose names do not appear on the 
latest property tax rolls--has a direct and substa11~ial 
interest in the public facilities and services, and the costs 
therefor, which are involved in annexation into a municipal 
government and should be allowed to participate politically 
in the annexation to the same extent that property owners 
participate. The burdens of annexation do not rest exclusively 
or even primarily on property taxpayers, but are borne by 
every inhabitant, renter, and consumer in the annexed area. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has found on numerous occasions that 
the difference between the interests of property owners and 
non-property owners are not sufficiently substantial to 
justify excluding non-property owners from the political 
process and that any law which permits political participa-
tion by persons having only a remote interest in the affairs 
at issue, while excluding others who have a distinct and 
direct interest is a violation of Equal Protection. Phoenix v. 
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free 
School District, 395 U.S. 621, 632-633 (1969). 
The cases cited by Appellants hit wide of the mark 
by raising issues, not of denial of equal participation in a 
petition process, but concerning the power of the legislature 
to pick reasonable annexation procedures which do not burden 
equal protection and of the power of cities to annex within 
those procedures. Here there is no issue as to whether an 
elective process must be established in the first place; 
-3-
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Amicus recognizes that the Supreme Court has never found a 
constitutional right to any election. The Court has, how-
ever, found that once an elective process is estribl ished 
- ' 
qualified individuals with a legitimate interest must be 
allowed to vote. For example, in Torres v. Village of Capit~, 
92 N.M. 64 (1978), the New Mexico Supreme Court never reaches 
the question of whether a petition system is similar enough 
to an election to invoke equal protection, it only finds that 
the legislature has the power to establish an annexation 
system which has no election at all. Indeed, the question of 
discrimination against non-property owners which this court 
must resolve could not have been considered by the Torres 
court, as it had no non-property owners before it. Likewise, 
the California case of Weber v. City Council, 9 Cal.3d 950 
(1973), only stands for the proposition that the legislature 
can establish an annexation process which has no voting or 
petitioning process, it says nothing about equal protection 
when a petition process has been established. 
The cases of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 
161 (1907); Child v. City of Spanish Fork, __ Utah 2d 
538 P.2d 184 (1975); Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135 
(1972); and Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County, 28 
Utah 2d 121 (1972), all relied upon by Appellant, deal only 
· · 1 overn· with the power of the legislature to create mun1c1pa g 
ments and confer authority on them, not at issue here. 
f . . 1. t ' power granted Indeed, the extensive reach o a mun1c1pa i Y s 
by the state and recognized in Hunter is still severely 
-4-
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limited by the reach of the Equal Protection clause. Curtis 
v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal.3d 942 (1972). 
Lastly, the issue is not one that may 12 ~esolved 
under the Due Process clause. The case of Freeman v. Center-
ville City, Utah 2d ~' 600 P.2d 1003 (1979), in examining 
10-2-401, considered only the due process rights to notice 
and hearing, not the equal protection distinction between 
property owners and non-property owners. Appellants' due 
process argument that non-property owners may participate in 
the annexation hearings held before the City Commission has 
nothing to do with the equal protection issue now before the 
Court. 
The equal protection standard which this Court must 
apply, and which controls the real issue that must be resolved, 
has been defined by Chief Justice Warren Burger as that 
protection which denies 
" ... to States the power to legislate that 
different treatment be accorded to persons 
placed by a statute into different classes 
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated 
to the objective of that statute. A 
classification must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike." 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). 
B. THE PETITION PROCESS, ESTABLISHING A MEANS BY WHICH 
INTERESTED AND AFFECTED LOCAL CITIZENS MAY EXPRESS APPROVAL 
OR DISAPPROVAL OF AN ANNEXATION, IS SO SIMILAR TO THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS THAT EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES MUST 
BE APPLIED. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The essence of Appellants' case lies in an artificial 
distinction between the petitiori process involved here and ~ 
election. It is clear that both systems are means ly which 
the government determines if sufficient public support exists 
to elect a candidate, resolve an issue, or change a system of 
government. In this case the receipt or denial of substantial 
rights and services, to be granted by a large municipality, 
directed by elected representatives, and cloaked with general 
governmental authority and police power, hangs on this deter· 
mination of popular support. The question then is whether 
this court will find that minor differences in the form and 
procedure of public participation in an election vis-a-vis 
the petition process are substantial enough to label the 
latter as less than a fundamental interest. 
In proposing this artificial distinction, Appellants 
rely on dicta in the Freeman case that the petition is only a 
"triggering process". Though perhaps a "trigger", it is a 
trigger with all the force of an election in terms of the 
positive, substantial influence cast over the final decision 
by city government, this especially so considering that 
non-property owners are excluded from a political process 
which either confers or completely denies annexation powers 
to the municipality. 
The fact that annexation is a two-tiered process, 
with the petition followed by a city commission decision 
because 1. f 1· t were an election triggering, is not dispositive 
but not binding, a city government decision, equal protectioo 
-6-
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guard11Lees would clearly apply. This was the result in 
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, where a two-step process--election 
followed by city government decision--controlled ·~~issuance 
of general obligation bonds. 399 U.S. 204, 206 (1970). 
Kolodziejski held that in those circumstances, a restriction 
of the franchise to property owners violated equal protection. 
Amicus would also submit that even if the petition 
is only a trigger, that it is equivalent to a candidate's 
obtaining of a place on a general election ballot in that it 
assures that a candidate (or an annexation) has at least a 
modicum of serious public support before binding elections 
(or hearings by the City Commission) are held. The Supreme 
Court has recognized an extension of the fundamental voting 
rights analysis to participation in political party primaries 
and to candidates' access to the ballot. Kusper v. Pontikes, 
414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
This fundamental rights analysis is aided by the consideration 
that in Utah there is only one means of annexation: city 
government action based on a determination of popular support. 
The cases of Torres v. Village of Capitan, supra, and Berry v. 
Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978), are thereby rendered 
less persuasive as they dealt with New Mexico and South 
Carolina statutes which allowed a city to complete an annexa-
tion by any of several means; that is, the city could still 
annex if there were no showing of local popular support--a 
significant difference from the Utah law. 
Even if this Court found that the minor procedural 
-7-
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differences between an election and a petition rendered the 
right to equal participation in the petition process less 
fundamental than election participation, the Cou::t' s obliga-
tion of "active and critical analysis" is not limited to 
elections or electoral qualifications but extends to laws 
"touching upon" the right to vote or to participate in politi· 
cal affairs. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d 
at 544. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized 
that fundamental rights anal~sis extends beyond the right ~ 
vote and includes the right to equally "participate in politi· 
cal affairs." Kramer, supra, at 626. The same equal protec-
tion standard of review used to test the constitutionality of 
limitations on voting rights should be used to test statutorih 
authorized petition rights. The application of this standard 
of review to classifications based on property ownership has 
been carefully explained by the Supreme Court in a series of 
three cases which extended the rights of non-property owners 
to participate fairly in political affairs dealing with 
property. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra, the 
right to vote for school board officials was extended to 
those other than parents and property owners. In Cipriano v. 
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court invalidated a 
statutory restriction allowing only property owners to parti· 
cipate in revenue bond elections. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 
supra, extended the Cipriano holding to elections approving 
tv 
general obligation bonds which were intimately tied to proper· 
tax and which could result in liens against real property. 
-8-
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These cases indicate a strong desire on the part of the Court 
to dispel archaic notions that local municipalities are 
supported only by property owners and to allow full participation 
in political affairs to all concerned and otherwise qualified 
citizens. 
Analysis of the applicability of the Kramer line of 
cases is furthered by a comparison of those cases with the 
later case of Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). In Salyer, the Court 
upheld a legislative scheme which restricted the vote in 
water district elections to property owners. This seeming 
departure from Kramer and its progeny was justified, however, 
by reason of the election's "special limited purpose and of 
the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners 
as a group." 410 U.S. at 728. The considerations of limited 
authority and disproportionate effect, joined with the fact 
that there was no general governmental powers granted to the 
water district, were sufficient to find a substantial interest 
on the part of property owners and little or no interest in 
or effect upon non-property owners. Salyer's application to 
the matter here at issue is obvious: Although the city is 
literally annexing acres, rather than persons, it is not 
acres that are benefited and burdened by the annexation. The 
effect of annexation does not disproportionately fall on 
property owners but rather on all residents of the area, 
property owners and non-property owners alike. In addition, 
the governmental unit being extended to the annexation area 
-9-
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is not one of limited purpose, but is possessed of broad 
police powers and general governmental authority. Because of 
Lhese reasons the same equal protection standard ~f review 
used in Kramer should be applied here to test the constitution· 
ality of limiting the right of petition to property owners. 
The California Supreme Court, in examining the right to 
protest, by petition, an annexation, found that it could 
" ... discern no reason, and respondents 
suggest none, why landowners enjoy a 
greater interest, or nonlandowners a 
lesser in't:erest, in the formation of a 
city of general powers than in its gover-
nance, or its issuance of general obliga-
tion bonds. Nor do we find a reason, and 
again respondents suggest none, why the 
interest of landowners becomes more com-
pelling, more worthy of special protec-
tion, in a protest proceeding [by petition] 
than in an election. 
We conclude that the principle estab-
lished in Kramer, Cipriano, Kolodziejski, 
and other cases applies fully to the 
present case. Nonlandowners share an 
equal interest with landowners in the 
formation of a city which could provide 
police and fire protection, maintain 
roads, acquire and develop parks, and 
furnish other public services. Moreover, 
cities derive revenue from many sources 
besides property taxes. Property taxes 
are levied on land and improvements, not 
land alone, and their burden includes 
tenants as well as landowners." Curtis v. 
Board of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d at 
550. 
When 10-2-401 was originally enacted in 1898, the 
legislature must have intended that no annexation would 
proceed without the approval of the populace involved, otherwi: 
there would have been no petition provision. Now, some BO 
-10-
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years later, when municipal revenues have shifted significantly 
away from property taxation and when cases like Kramer dictate 
that all qualified residents, not just property owners, have 
a legitimate right to participate in local government, this 
legislative intent that an annexation be based on an expression 
of popular support by those most affected stands to be frustrated. 
This frustration is brought about in two ways: first, the 
property owner restriction prohibits participation by a 
significant portion of the affected populace; second, the 
property owner restriction creates a major distortion of the 
size of the population to be considered and of the size of 
the majority required to sign. It is this dilution of repre-
sentation and distortion of the "majority" which constitutes 
a violation of the one man-one vote strand of equal protection 
analysis. 
By granting the petition right to land rather than 
to people, 10-2-401 ignores the observation of Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), that government represents 
"people, not trees or acres. Legislators are selected by 
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests." Where, 
as here, the annexation area is controlled by a few large 
landowners, those landowners--be they ranchers, developers, 
entrepreneurs, or businesses--can, by gerrymandering, manip-
ulate an annexation area to the point where the attitudes and 
interests of a majority of the landowners are completely 
adverse to those of the non-property owning residents. 
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"In addition to limiting the class of 
persons eligible to sign a petition to 
residents of a single area, states fre-
quently bar certain groups of residents 
f:om signing. The class of eligible 
signers may be limited to property owners, 
freeholders, taxpayers, or inhabitants 
in~tead of voters. It would seem appro-
priate to apply the principles of the 
franchise restriction cases to these 
restrictions on eligible signers, for 
both f~rms of restriction give a particular 
economic group a veto on a proposition 
with which others are also substantially 
concerned. Viewed in this light, such 
signer limitations appear clearly uncon-
stitutional. The Right to Vote in Munici-
pal Annexations, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1571, 
1606-1607 (1975). (Emphasis added). 
See also, Utah Law on Municipal Boundary Changes--Anarchy 
Among Modern City-States, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 697, 701-704, 
where serious questions are raised concerning the consti-
tutionality of Section 10-2-401. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently examined the 
right of equal participation in a petition process which was 
limited to property owners. The Court summarily reversed a 
lower court ruling that found no one man-one vote problems 
in the landowner classification. While it offered no ruling 
on the merits of the arguments there advanced by appellants, 
the Court observed that "it is fair to say that they are not 
insubstantial." Concerned Citizens of So. Ohio, Inc. v. P~ 
Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). 
One last consideration: Appellants have not pre· 
sented, nor can Amicus conceive of, a single rational reaso~ 
to distinguish between an election and a statutory petitioo 
process. Both are expressions of popular support which 
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differ only in the procedures by which they are administered. 
There is no constitutional magic about the election process; 
elections themselves are not universally guarantnc? by the 
Constitution. But the Supreme Court has found that equal 
participation in an election, even one which is not binding 
on the government's final decision, is a fundamental right. 
The same standards must be applied to the right of equal 
participation in political processes which influence, by 
popular determination, the form of a local representative 
government, even though those processes differ procedurally 
from the standard election system. 
II 
THE ANNEXATION STATUTE, BY DENYING A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF EQUAL POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION, MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A 
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST. THE STATUTE 
FAILS NOT ONLY THE COMPELLING STATE 
INTEREST TEST, BUT ALSO THE MILDER REQUIRE-
MENT OF SATISFYING A SUBSTANTIAL STATE 
INTEREST. 
The requirement that a statute which restricts a 
fundamental right must be supported by a compelling state 
interest in the classification is well established. Kramer, 
supra. It is also well established that few, if any, statutes 
have ever survivied the strict judicial scrutiny of the 
compelling state interest test. Amicus contends that the 
annexation statute does, indeed, infringe on a fundamental 
right of equal participation in political affairs and that 
thus the compelling state interest requirement would have to 
be s<ltisfied. It should be obvious that the State can point 
to nn interest so compelling that the strict scrutiny test 
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could be met: Appellants ha\·e not e\·en attempted to estab'-, . 
... - - -
that a compelling state interest justifies the proper:v c~~: 
distinction. It is, furthermore. the contention -• -\m:~~s 
that the annexation statute is supported by no state intere;: 
not rational, reasonable. substantial, nor compelling. 
Appellants advance several possible justificatio~; 
for the classification bet1-.-een property 01.-ning and non-pro;::e::· 
owning petitioners and for the exclusion of the latter gro~; 
The most obvious justification might be that such a restric-
tion, to property owners on the last tax rolls, makes it 
administratively more convenient for the city to act on a 
petition. But it is clear that administrative convenience _, 
an insufficient justification for a restriction of voting 
rights. Carrington v. Rush, 380 C. S. 89, 96 ( 1965) . This ., 
especially so when there is an insubstantial savings for the 
city, where there are alternative means which are not marke~:~ 
less convenient, and where there is a deprivation of importa~: 
rights. Here, there are many reasonable and non-burdensome 
alternatives; for example, the simple expedient of allo~ing 
property owners and registered voters to participate, 1o;hich 
would allow participation by all interested residents. Any 
increased burden, such as determining 1.·ho are residents at a 
given point in time, would be no more substantial than in a~ 
election. 
Other possible justifications are that property 
owners bear a disproportionate burden of supporting a munic:-
pality as compared to non-property owners. If that 1-;ere a 
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oc.:fr:cier.t justification, the Kramer - Cipriano - Kolodziejski 
::~e of cases ~ould have been decided differently. Today, 
~~en a smaller percentage of city revenues is depen~ent on 
:. :·c>perr_\· tax and 1o.·hen that ta." burden is passed on to renters, 
:onsumers, and other residents by the property owner, the 
~.irden of property ta." is not disproportionate. The property 
01>ner distinction might also be justified as a protection of 
:ocal interests, by leaving the annexation decision to property 
O'-llers 1>.'ho are tied to the land. This justification is 
1;i thou t merit where, as here, the property owners are those 
on ta." rolls which may, because there is no outer time limit 
on an annexation proceeding, be several years old by the time 
annexation is completed. This justification also fails where 
the landowners are large businesses and entrepreneurs who 
ha\'e no interest more local than their own pocketbooks. The 
"tax colony" justification advanced by Appellants is obviously 
inapplicable where the annexation procedure requires some 
basis in local popular support and the classification distin-
guishes between property owners and non-property owners, both 
of ~horn l>.'ould have the same interest in maintaining a tax 
colony. Lastly, the notion that such an unfair discrimina-
tion is supported by the fact that non-property owners have 
alternate means of representation is patently inapplicable 
here, 1>.'here they are granted no vote; no petition right; no 
representation on the city council; and, as the 1977 law 
provided, no guarantee of a public hearing. 
An imaginative court might still be able to con-
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ceive of some possible rational basis for such a distincti% 
and thereby satisfy a rational basis test. But analysis of 
equal protection guarantees has changed from the ol · rational 
basis test. It is clear that the U.S. Supreme Court requires 
more than some wishful, conceivable state interest. Today, 
even when not applying the strict scrutiny/compelling state 
interest test, the Supreme Court requires that governmental 
classifications or means must substantially further the 
statutory objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Likewise, the Court 
will no longer hypothesize some conceivable legislative 
purpose in the absence of an articulated legislative purpose. 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). 
The archaic nature of the distinction between 
property owners and non-property owners will simply not 
support a substantial state interest in today's world. 
Eighty years ago, when this distinction was hatched, renten 
were few and lifestyles and city revenues were different; 
property tax is no longer the only, or even a major source of 
city revenue. The Supreme Court's rationale in Kolodziejsti 
supports this contention. There the Court recognized the 
reality of passing on of property taxes to renters and con-
sumers (399 U.S. at 210) and stated that even if there wen ° 
increased burden on property owners it would be insufficient 
to overcome the inequities of not allowing interested non-
. · t ( t 212) If the Kolodziei 5' property owners to part1c1pa e a p. . ~
result is sound, where the general obligation bonds were paid 
-16-
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by property taxes and became a lien on real property, then 
the connection between annexation and property ownership here 
is even more tenuous and can support no conceivable state 
interest. This result has been recognized by the California 
Supreme Court: 
"In California and in many other 
states of the nation, provisions for 
municipal incorporation and for changes 
in the boundaries of local jurisdictions 
are archaic abominations dominated by the 
'horse and buggy' concepts of our rural 
past.... Legislation in many states 
still reflects outdated patterns where 
the property tax was virtually the sole 
source of local government revenue and 
outdated beliefs that the people in an 
area, however small, should have vir-
tually absolute control over their 'turf' 
as demarcated by city and other local 
government boundaries." Curtis v. Board 
of Supervisors, supra, 501 P.2d at 539. 
A consideration that seems to have completely 
escaped the Appellants is the possibility that there exist 
alternatives by which the interests of all affected residents 
may be served without substantially increasing the burden on 
the city. The Supreme Court has recognized that where less 
burdensome alternatives exist they should be pursued; that 
significant rights must not be sacrificed on an alter of 
convenience. "By requiring classifications to be tailored to 
their purpose, we do not secretly require the impossible. 
Here there is simply too attenuated a relationship between 
the state interest ... and the fixed requirement." Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). It cannot be denied that 
the relationship between annexation and property ownership is 
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"simply too attenuated." This principle was also recognized 
in Kramer, supra, when the court ruled that the property 
owner distinction was simply too imprecise to allm. partici· 
pation by all interested and affected citizens. The~ 
court, in requiring a more precise classification, found that 
we "must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, 
the interest which the state claims to be protecting, and the 
interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classificatior. 
Kramer, supra, at 626. Using this analysis, Anlicus submits 
that after careful consideration of the circumstances behind 
the annexation petition process, of the negligible interests 
that the property owner classification claims to protect, and 
of the significant loss of the franchise by directly interest<. 
and affected non-property owners, that the property ownership 
classification is glaringly imprecise and begs correction. 
Ill 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IS NOT BOUND BY 
THE RIGIDIFIED TWO-TIERED EQUAL PROTEC-
TION TEST UTILIZED IN THE PAST BY FEDERAL 
COURTS. IN EXAMINING VIOLATIONS OF 
UTAH'S EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES, OUR 
COURTS MAY UTILIZE A MORE REALISTIC 
ANALYSIS ARISING BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF 
THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND THE STRICT 
SCRUTINY TEST. 
Even if this Court found that there were no violatio: 
of a fundamental right to equal participation in political 
affairs and that there is some state interest at stake in 
this case, Anlicus would submit that the District Court's 
decision still must be affirmed. This Court is not limited to 
the two extremes of either the strict scrutiny test, which 111 ' 
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statute has passed, or the rational basis test, which no 
statute has failed. Those two tests are not mutually exclu-
sive, but are, rather, two ends of a spectrum of possible 
approaches in equal protection cases. The tests are like 
looking at a nearby object through either end of a telescope--
both views are unrealistic and distorted, with one being 
grossly deferential and the other overly critical. Concern-
ing this point, Justice Marshall has written: 
"I must once more voice my disagree-
ment with the Court's rigidified approach 
to equal protection analysis. [Citations 
omitted]. The Court apparently seeks to 
establish today that equal protection 
cases fall into one of two neat categories 
which dictate the appropriate standard of 
review--strict scrutiny or mere rational-
ity. But this Court's decisions in the 
field of equal protection defy such easy 
categorization. A principled reading of 
what this Court has done reveals that it 
has applied a spectrum of standards in 
viewing discrimination allegedly violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause. This 
spectrum clearly comprehends variations 
in the degree of care with which the 
Court will scrutinize particular cl,assifi-
cations, depending, I believe, on the 
constitutional and societal importance of 
the interest adversely affected and the 
recognized invidiousness of the basis 
upon which the particular classification 
is drawn." Dissent, San Antonio Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 98-99 (1973). 
Justice White has also found that "it is clear that 
we employ not just one, or two, but, as my brother Marshall 
has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards'"· Concur-
rence, Vlandis v. Kline, 412, U.S. 441, 458 (1973). While 
the Court has never embraced, in name, the spectrum approach 
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of Justices Marshall and White it is clear from recent 
' cases 
that the Court has recogized that intermediate levels of 
scrutiny exist. Beginning in 1972, the Court madE' l signifi· 
cant effort to formulate a single standard of review applicabi 
to all equal protection cases and also utilized the spectrw 
approach in conjunction with a less burdensome alternatives 
test. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. I~ 
(1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In 1974, the 
Court, in an eight to one opinion in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
applied an intermediate level of scrutiny--more than rational 
basis, but without finding any suspect classification or 
fundamental right, either of which would require strict 
scrutiny. In the Jimenez case, dealing with the rights of 
illegitimate children, the Court specifically eschewed strict 
scrutiny analysis and, indeed, found that the government had 
a legitimate interest, but that implementation of that in~Rr 
was unreasvnable. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 
636-637 (1974). Lastly, consider the Court's treatment of 
gender-based discrimination. Though the Court has never 
found sex to be a suspect classification (the nearest it has 
come is in Frontiero v. Richardson, when sex-as-a-suspect-
class received four votes), it has found violations of equal 
protection in some cases and found none in others. The 
result is an intermediate level of review appearing at various 
points along the spectrum between rational basis and strict 
scrutiny. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
-20-
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(19/6). If any case requires a legislative justification of 
more than mere rationality, it is clearly this one. 
In Justice Marshall's dissent he lists three con-
siderations important when equal protection cases are reviewed 
under a spectrum approach. The court must examine the character 
of the classification which the statute makes; the importance 
of the rights which are restricted or denied because of the 
classification; and the importance of the interest which the 
state asserts. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, 
at 99. To indicate the degree of acceptance which Marshall's 
spectrum approach has received,the majority in Dunn v. Blumstein, 
supra, at 335, holds that "to decide whether a law violates 
the Equal Protection clause, we look, in essence, to three 
things: the character of the classification in question; the 
individual interests affected by the classification; and the 
governmental interests asserted in support of the classifica-
tion." A careful review of the constitutionality of the 
statute in question requires an examination of those three 
considerations. 
First, concerning the character of the classifica-
tion between property owners and non-property owners, 10-2-401 
makes a three-fold discrimination between property owners and 
non-property owners; between long-term property owners and 
new property owners, by virtue of the "last assessment rolls" 
provision; and between large property owners and small property 
owners, by virtue of requiring both a majority of persons and 
ont'-lhird of assessed value. The class of those denied the 
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right to participate in the petition includes many persons 
rightfully concerned, interested, and affected by the 
annexa-
tion, namely property owners who have purchased si1.ce the 
last assessment (which could, incidentally, be a long time, 
considering that the statute put no limit on the vitality of 
a petition between its signing and the completion of the 
annexation), contract buyers, renters and other adults who 
live with property owners, and any other inhabitant of the 
annexation area who may be an otherwise qualified voter, ~t 
whose name does not appear on the tax rolls. The property 
owners, on the other hand, who are permitted to petition, 
need not be registered voters; residents of the annexation 
area or of the state; adults; or even natural persons. T~ 
classification is based solely on property ownership of some 
duration, without regard for the interests of those who would 
be most intimately affected, interested, and knowledgeable 
about the annexation and the area which it involves. In 
short, the classification has no reasonable relationship~ 
the goal of determining the wishes of those affected by an 
annexation. 
Second, concerning the importance of the rights 
asserted by the disadvantaged class, it is unquestioned that 
the non-property owners have a substantial and proper interes: 
in the public facilities and services, and the costs therefor 
which are involved in an annexation. Kramer, supra, teaches 
that a law which permits inclusion of those having only a 
remote interest in local affairs, while excluding many ot~r 
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who have a distinct and direct interest, is a violation of 
equal protection. This Court must carefully examine such a 
law ''because statutes distributing the franchise constitute 
the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified 
discrimination in determining who may participate in political 
affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines 
the legitimacy of our representative government." Kramer, 
supra, at 626. The potential for harm to non-property owners' 
interests when an annexation, bringing with it as it does, a 
representative government of broad powers and general authority, 
is railroaded through by a few big businesses or entrepreneurs 
is obvious. 
The substantial impact which the petition, by 
itself, has on the decision of city government is undeniable 
and, together with the fact that existence of a two-tiered 
decision process does not save an unequal distribution of the 
franchise, indicates that access to the petition, even if it 
is only a trigger, is a fundamental right. The equal protec-
tion infirmities of 10-2-401 cannot be cured by asserting, as 
Appellants do, that non-property owners have a voice in later 
procedures; the same could be said of any denial of the 
franchise which is subject to review by judicial or adminis-
trative tribunals. Besides, the statute did not, at the 
time, even require that such later procedures be open to the 
public. Important rights of fair and equal participation in 
political affairs have been denied to non-property owners by 
•h~ ~tatute in question. 
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Third, concerning the importance of the interests 
which the state asserts, much of what has been argued above 
at Section II could be repeated here. Suffice it to say tha: 
Appellants' assertion that some wishful, conceivable state 
interest will save this statute is not enough; governmental 
means must be substantially related to governmental ends. 
Craig v. Boren, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra; McGinnis v. 
Royster, supra. No substantial interest has been here pre-
sented. 
"We can discern no reason, and 
respondents suggest none, why landowners 
enjoy a greater interest, or nonland-
owners a lesser interest, in the formation 
of a city of general powers than in its 
governance, or its issuance of general 
obligation bonds. Nor do we find a 
reason, and again respondents suggest 
none, why the interest of landowners 
becomes more compelling, more worthy of 
special protection, in a protest proceed-
ing [by petition] than in an election." 
Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 
501 P.2d at 550. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have not suggested, nor can Amicus 
conceive of, any reason to distinguish between an election 
and a statutory petition process which is created to ser~u 
a method by which those who are most affected can vote to 
extend or deny annexation jurisdiction to a municipal go~~ 
ment. The two-tiered nature of the annexation procedure; 
that is, petition followed by city commission approval, is 
not alone disposi tive as in similar situations the guarantee! 
of the Equal Protection clause have been extended. Non-p~~ 
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owners who are directly affected by and intimately concerned 
with an annexation have a right to participate in the annexa-
tion to the same extent that property owners participate. 
Any statute which unfairly distributes a right of franchise, 
even by petition, violates a fundamental right to equal 
participation in political affairs and, as such, must be 
supported by a compelling state interest. The statute here 
at issue is not supported by any state interest, not compelling, 
substantial, nor rational. Even if the petition right were 
construed as not fundamental and if it were found that the 
state has some interest, this Court is not bound by the gross 
deference of the rational basis test or the excessive severity 
of the compelling state interest test, but may forge a new 
test between those extremes, consisting of an examination of 
the nature of the rights restricted, the characteristics of 
the disadvantaged class, the nature of the state's interest, 
and the precision of the relationship between statutory means 
and ends. Such a test must be resolved in favor of equal 
political participation by all those affected and the result 
must be an affirmation of the District Court's finding that 
10-2-401, Utah Code Ann. (1953), is unconstitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, I:iu :~ (), ,4tt l(u~ 
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